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My paper is addressed to two related questions: What are the feminist issues concerning 
argument/argumentation? What can feminist theorizing contribute to the philosophy of argument 
/argumentation theory that is not readily available in other (not-specifically-feminist) approaches 
to theorizing argument?  While these two questions presage a larger project, I will, in this paper, 
address them largely within the context of a response to Trudy Govier’s chapter “Feminists, 
Adversaries, and the Integrity of Argument” (Govier 1999, ch. 4; also ch. 14).  Govier pays 
particular attention to feminist concerns with the adversariality of argument in many 
understandings of argument, so this will also be a primary focus in my paper. 
 It is now widely acknowledged that the adversariality of argument and argumentation is 
illustrated and significantly reinforced by the “argument as war” metaphor, a prominent 
metaphor in conceptions of argument (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Ayim 1988, Cohen 1995).  
While it is also regularly acknowledged that metaphors often prove to be helpful, if not 
necessary, devices in theorizing, the concern with argument as war (and related metaphors--
confrontational sports metaphors, for example) is that it is such a dominant one that it has 
restricted, if not seriously limited, theorizing about and, thus, conceptions and understandings of 
argument.  One of my goals below is to explore specific ways in which feminist reflections 
contribute to this discussion.  In particular, I will argue for a more direct exploration of the 
relationship between metaphors of battle or war and metaphors of gender, particularly as both of 
these metaphors have informed conceptions of reason and rationality which bear on conceptions 
of argument.  This exploration, I will maintain, opens up another dimension of the discussion 
about argument as war.  In addition, it opens up another dimension of the feminist debate about 
adversariality, and it circumvents some of the difficulties that have arisen as a result of the way 
in which adversariality has so far been advanced as a feminist issue. 
I should mention a few things about how I understand the terms “argument” and 
“feminist” in my discussion.  Following Govier, I will confine attention to arguments that have 
some kind of a dialectical context–arguably all meaningful and interesting arguments. In 
particular, these are arguments (including arguments with oneself) which have claims that are “in 
some way at issue, and the practice of argument is then engaged with a recognition that 
difference and disagreement, and thus possibilities of rational persuasion, exist” (1999, 46-51, 
my emphasis).  (Though, of course, what exactly constitutes “rational” persuasion is itself a 
central issue in theories of argument.)  As for the term “feminist,” I use it largely in a descriptive 
sense: it indicates theorists and a body of work (reflections, positions, discussions...) 
significantly concerned with issues of sex, gender and, often too, other power- or status-inflected 
social divisions.  In contrast to cultural and some academic stereotyping (still), the term 
”feminist” in any given area of theoretical concern rarely refers to one position or claim, or one 
set of such claims, that all feminists in that area supposedly agree to.   Indeed, the continuing 
growth and impact of feminist theorizing in many areas is significantly energized by practices of 
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argumentation that engage distinct differences and disagreements.  It would, therefore, be strange 
to suggest that many feminists disparage argument and argumentation, which is not to deny that 
many of them might have specifically-feminist concerns with particular conceptions or 
metaphorical depictions of argument. 
Feminist concerns with argument have involved two (not unconnected) issues.  The first 
issue relates to possible gender differences in reasoning and arguing, and raises questions about 
whether traditional understandings of arguing and argument have favored “masculine” modes, 
styles, or methods of reasoning and arguing (Orr 1989, Gilbert 1994, Verbiest 1995, Fulkerson 
1996).  In these discussions the “masculine” mode is typically described as linear, abstract, 
separating emotion from reason, and antagonistic, whereas the “feminine” mode is narrative, 
context sensitive, relational, and supportive.  However, there are problems with the way in which 
this issue is advanced as a feminist one, since these kinds of gender difference claims have been 
quite contentious in feminist theorizing.  There is notable debate about whether “essential” 
differences exist in any significant degree, and, if they do, how they might be theoretically 
explained and understood. Many argue that purported differences rest on gender stereotyping in 
perceptions and social regulation—though, if so, they can carry cognitive weight.  Others argue 
that differences may be explained by the kinds of cognitive tasks or situations that evoke 
different reasoning methods--with gender a factor in how such tasks are distributed.   In addition, 
I would add in this context that it is often not clear what modes or qualities such as “linear,” 
“abstract,” “contextual,” “relational,” or “supportive” mean when it comes to spelling out their 
operation in the specifics of argumentation, particularly when they are presented as oppositional 
modes.  Abstracting well or appropriately from a given situation often involves a careful 
assessment of the contextual particulars and nuances of the situation.  Linear reasoning may be 
quite appropriate in deductive reasoning contexts, while narrative expansion is often very 
appropriate in eliciting and then reasoning about the relational complexities of moral situations.  
(For a discussion of these concerns, specifically in connection with debates about gender and 
moral reasoning, see Rooney 2001.) 
In her response to these difference claims, Govier argues that there is nothing in the 
practice of argument as such that requires formalism and rigidity, and that excludes attention to 
the “feminine” factors or modes such as attention to contextual details or supportiveness.  
Indeed, this is significantly the case with the kinds of identification and analysis of argument 
encouraged within the informal logic movement, to which Govier has significantly contributed.  
Govier is also skeptical about claims concerning distinct gender-inflected thinking and reasoning 
styles–justifiably so given feminist debates, as I noted above.  However, she adds that even if 
there are such differences, “there are good independent reasons... [for] pay[ing] attention to 
context and nuances of meaning...” (52, my emphasis).  She continues: 
 
If there are such things as “narrative arguments” and if those arguments are genuinely 
arguments,...then they merit attention and analysis.  If we should come to believe that 
some narrative arguments are cogent, we will then seek an understanding of how 
narrative makes premises relevant to a conclusion and sufficient to provide good grounds 
for accepting it  (1999, 52). 
 
My main concern with Govier’s position here is that the feminist question as such largely 
drops out. While I agree that there are many good “independent reasons” for claims emerging out 
of feminist work, I want to leave open the distinct possibility that feminist work (work that keeps 
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gender issues right there as an important focus in the discussion) can provide understandings of 
argument and context that are not available without such a focus.  The question about which 
arguments are “genuinely arguments” is very much an open question in many forums (including 
this one here in Windsor).  This leaves open the possibility that feminist reflection may 
contribute in a unique way to questions such as whether narrative arguments (or other kinds of 
arguments) are genuine arguments.  Feminist work, for instance, provides important insights into 
the ways in which contexts and narratives can be experienced quite differently by those in 
different social and cultural locations.  Thus, many feminist theorists challenge the facility with 
which theorists appeal to “we” of different genders and different cultures and ethnicities, in, for 
example, projecting that “we” can come to some kind of general transcultural agreement about 
how narrative arguments are cogent.  Narratives are often compelling (including in an 
argumentative sense) when they dovetail with the narratives of our individual lives and 
experiences. For example, battle and war narratives are typically more compelling in war 
cultures and with people whose lives and identities involve or might involve warring or war-like 
activities.  Thus, making claims and arguments about arguments--about what arguments are, 
how they are valuable, what it is to be successful or effective with an argument, and so on--in 
terms of battle or war narratives are likely to be more meaningful and compelling with those 
engaged or expected to engage in such activities. 
This brings us quite directly to the adversariality issue, the second main feminist issue 
with argument, though it is also connected to specific gender differences claims– that males are 
likely to be more antagonistic and adversarial in arguing, while females are more supportive and 
conciliatory.  Here our attention is often drawn to the surrounding contexts and practices of 
argumentation and debate.  These contexts are often infused with aggression, confrontation, 
coercion, and put downs, and particularly in a way that may put women at a disadvantage 
(Moulton 1983, Ayim 1988, Tannen 1998).  Social and cultural norms of gendering still 
condone, if not encourage, male aggression and confrontation as “natural” (after all, “boys will 
be boys”).   However, those same norms, even with feminist change, still consign similar 
expressions of aggression in females to somewhat mixed perceptions and descriptions--as in: 
“it’s good that she speaks up, but isn’t she somewhat brash and uppity?”  (We all know, of 
course, how strident feminists are, whereas men who speak up on behalf of social and political 
justice rarely, if ever, are!)  As a result of what now may be the more subtle forms of gender 
conditioning and gendering in perceptions (which can also affect written argumentation), the 
sometimes quieter or more tentative voices of many women and some men often don’t get 
heard– in both literal and metaphorical senses of “heard” (including “carry weight or authority”). 
Feminist concerns with this specific aspect of adversariality can and have been addressed 
in both practical and theoretical ways.  The ongoing encouragement and support of women’s 
public speaking continues to be addressed in many educational and political contexts.  On the 
more theoretical side, many dialectical rules of procedure endorsed by most argumentation 
theorists, from Paul Grice’s “cooperative principle” to the specific rules of the pragma-dialectical 
school, clearly impugn such displays of aggression and adversariality in argumentation. These 
rules encourage respectful listening and careful assessment of differences in positions and points 
of view.  They are not simply recommended in order to make argumentation more pleasant or, 
given cultural norms, more hospitable to women.  They are required by generally accepted 
epistemological norms of good argumentation which endorse a careful weighing of all the 
evidence, particularly when that evidence emerges from different experiences, perspectives, or 
points of view.   
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The point that I have advanced here is significantly similar to Govier’s response to 
feminist concerns with hostile and quarrelsome argumentative practices.  However, Govier adds, 
such feminist concerns do not impugn argument per se, since she submits “that argument is not 
necessarily confrontational and that adversariality can be kept to a logical, and polite, 
minimum... [A]rgument may embrace the positive goals of persuasion and justification without 
necessitating adversariality in any negative sense” (55).  In a later chapter, titled, “The Positive 
Power of Controversy” (ch. 14), Govier expands on this idea by drawing a distinction between 
what she calls ancillary adversariality (the hostility, name-calling, and rudeness that sometimes 
accompanies argumentation) and minimal adversariality that Govier thinks may be an inevitable, 
and not necessarily negative, part of argument.   
The minimal adversariality implicit in argument arises, Govier notes, from the fact that 
people have definite beliefs or opinions.  When an occasion arises where differences need to be 
addressed, disagreements, criticisms, challenges of others’ premises, and so on, result.  She 
illustrates this with what we might call the paradigm case of difference--where I hold X and you 
hold not-X.  She proceeds to examine steps in our description of our disagreement: she notes 
where minimal adversariality can readily make an appearance, but it need not be considered 
especially negative or destructive (1999, 244).  From this basic difference, Govier continues, it 
follows that I think that non-X is not correct (step 3).  From there one could quite naturally say 
(step 4) that I think that you (or anyone else who holds not-X) are wrong, or are making a 
mistake.  Govier does not question this move, but I suggest that there is already more 
confrontation elicited here than is necessary.  To go from saying that I think that your belief not-
X is mistaken or incorrect to “you are wrong” is surely an extra and unnecessary step.  It also 
illustrates a problematic slippage that I think is a consequence of the pervasiveness of argument 
as war imagery–the slippage from a person’s belief or claim to the person herself, her identity 
and worth.   It makes more sense to think of people going to battle than to think of beliefs going 
to battle each other!  
Govier does render “questionable” the next 2 steps or claims which, again, we might very 
easily and naturally make in describing this argument situation.  “Should I need to argue for X, I 
will thereby be arguing against not-X” (step 5); “Those who hold not-X are, with regard to the 
correctness of X and my argument for X, my opponents” (step 6, my emphases).  While I agree 
with Govier that we often quite comfortably and naturally say such things, I want to render these 
even more questionable. With regard to 5, could I not just as easily, and perhaps more accurately, 
say that I am arguing with not-X and with your argument for not-X, in that I am taking into 
consideration and reasoning with your premises and reasoning for not-X--even if at the end of 
the exchange I still hold X?  Isn’t this argument a particular kind of conversation (one where we 
are working through differences in beliefs), and don’t we normally say we converse with rather 
than against people or their conversation?  Relating to 6, why are you my “opponent” if you are 
providing me with further or alternative considerations in regard to X, whether I end up agreeing 
with X or not-X?  What I want to suggest with these rhetorical questions is not that we should 
hold back the confrontational wording in order to be nicer or more polite, but that this wording is 
misdecribing the argument situation.  
The fact that such (relatively mild) antagonistic and confrontational wording is 
comfortably embedded in what we might take to be very natural, neutral, and common 
descriptions (misdescriptions) of this and similar argument situations suggests that the boundary 
between Govier’s minimal and ancillary adversarialities is more fluid or porous than we might 
initially think.  (In rendering the last two steps questionable Govier perhaps thinks so too.)   
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Battle images and wording cut across both.  War-like metaphors (shooting down points, 
attacking positions and persons, going after fatal flaws, and so on), often enacted more explicitly 
and problematically with ancillary adversariality, have their less bellicose cousins--but cousins 
still--work their way quite easily into our basic understandings and descriptions of argument and 
arguing.  They do so to the extent that, as I maintain above, we barely recognize them as such, 
even when they are characterizing argument situations in erroneous and confusing ways.  Such 
situations can often be described well, indeed more accurately, in terms of basic epistemological 
notions like beliefs, differences in beliefs, hearing and adducing new or different evidence in 
support of beliefs or their negations, modifying or changing one’s beliefs, and so on.   With such 
descriptions “losing” an argument is more accurately portrayed as an epistemological gain: one 
ends up with beliefs that, in their change or modification, are better supported and more likely to 
be true. 
But now it looks like I have done what I was concerned earlier that Govier had done: I 
seem to have dropped this issue (concerning argumentation and adversariality) as also and 
significantly a feminist issue.  My position above about problems with adversariality rests largely 
on relatively neutral and generally accepted epistemological concepts and claims about 
differences in beliefs and support for beliefs.  But this is not the end of the story.  It is the 
beginning of a new one.  A central question now looms: Given some of the obvious problems 
with adversariality, now acknowledged in many circles (not just feminist ones), how did 
adversariality became so implanted in understandings and conceptions of argument in the first 
place, and why has it taken so long to see its problems?  A better understanding of how we got 
ourselves into this problematic situation might also give us an understanding of how we might 
get ourselves back out of it.  I will now proceed to examine this adversariality in a way that 
renews feminist attention on it, yet doesn’t engage problematic assumptions about essential or 
natural gender differences in styles or modes of reasoning and arguing.  (Though beyond the 
scope of this paper, I would argue that engaging the debate about sex differences (in styles of 
arguing) in terms of the larger historical perspective I now proceed to discuss would be a way to 
constructively expand that debate.)   
The approach I advocate involves noting connections between metaphors of gender and 
metaphors of war or battle in philosophical conceptions of reason and rationality.  Given that 
arguing has been understood as a paradigmatic example of reasoning--perhaps the paradigmatic 
example-- it soon becomes apparent why conceptions and understandings of argument could 
hardly escape the battling images inspired in significant ways by “the battle of the sexes,” as that 
metaphor was embedded in conceptions of reason. In the space remaining, however, I can do 
little more than sketch these connections.  Some of my positions clearly require more historical 
textual exegesis than I can give here, though I have undertaken more of it elsewhere (Rooney 
1991, 2002).  My main goal here is to reinstate concerns with adversariality as, in addition to 
other concerns, specifically feminist ones.  
A central project in feminist philosophy involves examining the various ramifications of 
the long exclusion or discouragement of women from philosophy.  Traditional core philosophical 
concepts and methods fall within the scope of such examinations.  Feminist philosophers 
continue to explore philosophical texts, not simply with a view to what is written there about 
actual women, but also with a keen eye for the discursive role of the symbolic “woman” and 
“feminine.”  There is now a substantial body of work which draws attention to woman as a 
deeply embedded cultural, symbolic, and linguistic category that has functioned within 
philosophy as the foil, “the other” upon which/whom is projected disparaged modes of 
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embodiment, locatedness, disunity, disorder, subjectivity and irrationality (Lloyd 1993, Le 
Doeuff 1991; Rooney 1991, 2002). In effect, ideal or fully rational “humanity” was often 
theorized and conceptualized as a distancing from, or battle against, modes of irrationality, 
chaos, and disorder (or, on occasion, disruptive charm) that were regularly cast as “feminine” in 
the philosophical imaginary (Le Doeuff 1989).  It is important to note that this projection thereby 
casts philosophical ideals of human nature, reason, clarity, and so on, as “masculine” in the sense 
of “other than feminine.” The “battle of the sexes” is a deeply embedded notion in traditional 
Western philosophy, and it is fundamentally bound up with the sexism embellished in many 
traditional accounts of human nature, value, and reason. The point is not simply that various 
concepts and locations are marked as “masculine” or “feminine,” but that these gender 
associations carry with them a host of cultural assumptions and divisions that are carried over 
into the concepts and structures of “abstract” philosophical theorizing, and these concepts, in 
turn, reinforce those cultural associations and assumptions.  The examination of the role of 
gender metaphors and symbols in philosophy thus affords a helpful example of what many 
metaphor theorists like Lakoff and Johnson take as a given: metaphors do cognitive work in 
theorizing (in delineating concepts, in structuring our thinking and understanding of things...) 
that would not get done without them. 
In a previous paper on the metaphorical gendering of reason, I have addressed the 
recurring portrayal of reason in terms of images and metaphors that involve the exclusion or 
denigration of something--body, passion, emotion, instinct, nature…--that is cast as “feminine” 
(Rooney 1991; also see Lloyd 1993, 2002).  A lapse in reason, or the surfacing of unreason, is 
often characterized by the intrusions of bodily passions, feminine emotions, or the distraction of 
unruly feminine charms.  Despite more direct constructive definitions of reason and rationality in 
terms of specific methods of reasoning and what they can achieve, we thus get a strong sense of 
a persistent strain of embattlement.  Reason, in its broader conceptions, is thus often 
circumscribed in negative or contrastive terms: it is often valued through a simultaneous 
devaluation of other qualities or faculties (“feminine” emotion or imagination, for instance) or 
other creatures (non-human animals trapped by nature and instinct, or women, just about trapped 
by body and nature).  
My main concern in this paper is not primarily with the masculinization of reason and the 
simultaneous feminization of unreason, but with the accompanying or resultant embattlement and 
defensive vigilance of reason and, in turn, argumentation.  Reason is textually constructed as 
“masculine” in a specific defensive or warding off mode.  Here are some examples where these 
images of battle are quite prominent.  In the Republic, Plato discusses the type of philosophical 
reasoning needed to abstract and analyze the Form of the Good, a rationality that is able to 
distinguish appearance from reality and knowledge from opinion.  He describes this rationality as 
a “fortress that must be defended by a tactical arsenal of well-armed arguments.”  (Republic, 
534bc; other translations of this passage render it thus: “the man…by reason...[must] as in a 
battle, survive all refutations… ”; “the man [who is to] really know the good itself [must] as it 
were in battle, running the gauntlet of all tests... hold on his way through all this without tripping 
in his reasoning.”)  Over two millennia and many similar metaphors later, when Wittgenstein in 
his later work describes the vigilance with language that is required in doing philosophy he states 
that “Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language” 
(Philosophical Investigations, §109, Rooney 2002).  In some of these metaphorical constructions 
the battling off of the ‘feminine” is quite prominent; in others we get the clear sense it is there in 
the background, or underground yet still threatening, like the Furies were for Plato.  Within this 
 6 
P. Rooney’s “Feminism and Argumentation: A Response to Govier” 
philosophical imaginary in the background, success in reasoning, and thus also in arguing, is 
then fundamentally bound up with success in battling.  Argument as war or battle between two 
discussants is then rendered, not as a battle between “masculine” and “feminine” positions, but 
between two “battling off the feminine,” that is, “masculine” positions.  Perceived failures in 
argumentation can, however, be feminized, as when one is said to “chicken out” or “wimp out” 
of the argument.   
 This link between work on gender metaphors and symbolism undertaken more directly 
under the rubric of feminist philosophy and work on war metaphors and symbolism undertaken 
more directly under the rubric of not-specifically-feminist work in argumentation theory has so 
far not been significantly explored, but clearly needs to be.  This work need not be confined to 
the adversariality question.  There is every reason to think that exploring such links might have a 
significant impact on the way we understand the role of, among other things, context, individual 
involvement, particularity, and narrative in argument.  Abstraction and reason (and consequently 
argument) were often conceptualized in terms of transcendence of embodied contexts or 
emotion-imbued persons and narratives, that is, transcendence of the particulars and vagaries of 
the “feminine” world.  I agree with Govier that there may be good “independent reasons” for 
paying special attention to these aspects of argumentation.  But also, there is no reason to think 
that specifically-feminist insights into these traditionally “feminine,” and, thus, regularly 
neglected or disparaged aspects of argumentation, might add other good reasons for such special 
attention, or render the independent reasons even more compelling. 
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